Intra-daily dynamics of dollar-sterling exchange market by Hadjipantelis, Pantelis-Zenon
 University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap 
 
This paper is made available online in accordance with 
publisher policies. Please scroll down to view the document 
itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item and our 
policy information available from the repository home page for 
further information.  
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
Author(s):  Pantelis Hadjipantelis 
Article Title:  Intra-daily dynamics of dollar-sterling exchange market 
Year of publication: Forthcoming 
Link to published article: None 
Publisher statement:   None 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intra-daily dynamics of dollar-sterling exchange market I
Pantelis - Zenon Hadjipantelis1
Complexity Science DTC, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Abstract
This report describes the results of an initial exercise to explore the stylized facts of
the dynamic properties of exchange rates employing a behavioral finance framework
and high-frequency, second-scale, data. It uses a heterogeneous agent model, where
chartist and fundamentalist traders coexist, in order to offer insights on their intra-
daily movements and responses, to different market states. We find significant variations
between the variables used to describe the agent’s behavior in daily scales and that of
intra-daily scales. The evolutionary stability of the otherwise irrational chartist behavior
is demonstrated.
Keywords: Heterogeneous agents, Exchange rate decomposition, Kalman Filter
1. Introduction
Contrary to stock markets, where the trading times are determined by the locality of
the market itself, foreign exchange markets trade continuously. Furthermore, according
to the Bank of International Settlements, the USD-GBP pair accounts for 12% of the
world total foreign exchange market turnover[1]. Therefore it is of great interest to
analyze the underlaying dynamics of the price formation mechanism for such a market.
Employing the standard chartist-fundamentalists’ approach developed in the work of
Brock and Holmes [2], the arithmetic mean between best Bid and best Ask is used to
derive the market clearing price using the available tick-by-tick data. The data are then
aggregated to 1-, 5-, 12- and 30- second intervals in order to be analyzed. Data of this
nature are machine recorded, and while highly noisy and prone to extreme fluctuations,
are not prone to errors, except in cases where traders themselves make mistakes which
they then enter the system. Therefore these data exhibit a fertile field to analyze the
effect of news and how these news influence intra-daily changes among traders’ strategies.
News is defined as interest rate announcements, made by the Bank of England. The work
presented will attempt to address in a stylized manner the question of the short range
effects of news, on players’ behavior. To achieve this, we focus specifically on the data
available for days, when it is known that news were released by the Bank of England[3].
There is a surprising absence of literature examining the second-scale data of intra-
daily foreign exchange rates and how beliefs are formed on such a fine scale. Works
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by Sato [4, 5] and Mizuno [6] take an econophysics approach in the utilization of such
high-frequency data. Nevertheless they focus mostly on results concerning statistical
distributions and correlations of exchange rate fluctuations and do not address issues
regarding the behavior of the traders.
The works of Frankel and Froot in 1986 [7] and in 1990 [8], introduced the modeling
notion of a foreign exchange market that is structured around agents/traders employing
a chartists-fundamentalists’ belief framework. Based on this model, insight into traders
behavior can be provided. De Grauwe and Dewachter [9] extended this framework,
providing evidence about its chaotic nature and put a significant emphasis on the role of
each individual strategy. If the reader wishes to probe further into a bibliographic survey
of agent-based computational finance, LeBaron offers an invaluable reference [10].
The paper will be organized as follows: The next Section provides a basic description
of the model employed. Section 3 will offer an outline of the Kalman Filter used here
as the technique to derive the fundamental exchange rate. Section 4 will present the
numerical estimation results and the effects that news arrivals appears to have on the
system. The discussion and interpretation of the estimation results follows in Section 5.
Finally section 6 will offer some concluding remarks.
2. Heterogeneous Agent Model
Following the theoretical framework introduced by De Grauwe and Grimaldi [11] and
which was extended by Kozhan and Salmon [12], we consider the interaction between
domestic and foreign currency through the exchange rate, which is denoted by st and is
set to be the price of one unit of foreign currency in units of domestic currency. In the
current case, for convenience the domestic currency is assumed to be the US dollar and
foreign currency the GB Pound (£/$) . The market is populated by N traders who can
assume two distinctive strategies or ”beliefs”: chartists or fundamentalists.
Quoting Sarno and Taylor[13]: Chartist, or ”technical,” analysis uses charts of financial-
asset price movements to infer the likely course of future prices and thus to derive fore-
casts and trading strategies. In essence, the chartist trader acts as a noise trader. They
ignore the fundamentals of the exchange rate and extrapolate past movements of the
market exchange rate st into the future. It is safe to say that the chartist approach is
effectively a positive feedback loop. In the current setting, the simplest possible chartist
rule is used mainly for analytic tractability. The chartist assumes that the change in the
exchange rate will be equal to the arithmetic mean of the two most recent changes in the
exchange rate ∆st−1 and ∆st−2. Therefore their forecast is explicitly given by
Et(st+1|C) = st−1 + β 12((st−1 − st−2) + (st−2 − st−3)), (1)
where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 represents the degree of chartist extrapolation. Clearly, modern day
chartists use more highly sophisticated rules. On the one hand Kozhan and Salmon in
their model use a simple long-short moving average rule, De Grauwe and Grimaldi use of
an exponential decay memory mechanism. Brock and Hommes on the other hand in their
seminal work used a single lag, in a simple linear forecasting rule [14]. Furthermore it
seems rather improbable that all (or even enough) agents will coordinate their forecasts
under the same rule, regardless of its sophistication. Nevertheless such a rule does not
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prohibit certain stylized facts to be derived and quite possibly amplifies the tendency of
chartists to trade on noise, emphasizing the differences in the two approaches.
A fundamentalist assumes the existence of an underlaying equilibrium/latent price
(fundamental value) s∗t . Based on his estimation about the fundamental rate’s true
value, they then compare the present market clearing exchange rate with the fundamental
exchange rate and forecasts the movement of the future market exchange rate as a drift
towards the fundamental rate. Their forecasting rule can be explicitly given by
Et(st+1|F ) = st−1 − ψ(st−1 − s∗t−1), (2)
where 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1, represents the speed with which fundamentalists expect the market
exchange rate to return to the fundamental exchange rate. In this case it can be easily
argued that a fundamentalist approach is practically a negative feedback loop trying to
anchor the market clearing exchange rate back to its fundamental value. The fundamen-
talists know that there is a band of inactivity in the goods market [11]. The meaning of
this is, that if the market clearing exchange rate is not deviating from the fundamen-
tal exchange rate enough, there are no market mechanisms to drive the realized market
clearing rate back to the exact latent fundamental rate. Thus, the fundamentalists real-
ize that there are no profit opportunities for them and predict no actual change in the
market clearing rate. More formally, if :∣∣st−1 − s∗t−1∣∣ < C ⇒ Et(st+1|F ) = st−1 (3)
where clearly if
∣∣st−1 − s∗t−1∣∣ ≥ C, the original fundamentalists forecasting rule is em-
ployed as fundamentalists recognize profit opportunities.
One can easily observe that in both formulas the value of st is not present despite
t being the actual moment of prediction. That is because under a Walrasian market
equilibrium frame, as here, the agents have access only to publicly available information
up to time t − 1 and also because the actual realized foreign exchange rate at time t
depends on the forecasts for st+1[11]. This idea regarding the informational inefficiency
of the markets, was put forward by Hellwig [15] and has proved central in recent research
in the field [12, 16].
As argued by recent papers [16–19] there is increasing empirical evidence support-
ing the validity of this model. It appears, that determinants of dispersion involving the
traders’ expectations, show consistency with the assumptions of a exchange market envi-
ronment that is populated by chartists and fundamentalists traders. Work by Taylor and
Sarno [13] and earlier Taylor and Allen [20] have demonstrated the presence of technical
traders in the market presenting a number of examples from foreign exchange markets
around the world.
Going back to the technical details of the model it is clear that the proportion of these
two types of agents are changing over time and are subject to their relative performance
in profit-making. In each case the agents strive to maximize their utility function :
U(W it+1) = Et(W
i
t+1)−
1
2
µV i(W it+1), (4)
where W it+1 is the wealth of agent i at time t + 1, Et is the expectation operator, µ
is the risk aversion coefficient, and V i(W it+1) represents the conditional variance of the
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wealth of agent i. This utility function is in direct relation, regarding its mean variance
framework, with the Capital Asset Pricing model proposed by Treynor.
The exact wealth of an agent i is itself given by the following formula:
W it = (1 + r
∗)stdi,t−1 + (1 + r)(W it−1 − st−1di,t−1) (5)
where r and r∗ denote the domestic and foreign interest rate respectively and di,t are the
holdings of the foreign assets by agent i at time t. Using this setting, the first term in
the above equation describes the value of the foreign portfolio in terms of the domestic
currency and the second term, the value of the domestic portfolio itself.
One of the advantages of this setting is that it allows the analytical tractability of
the model and the derivation of the optimal holdings of foreign assets in time t. That is
done by substituting Eq. 5 in Eq.4 and then maximizing with respect to di,t. Therefore,
more formally the optimal holdings of foreign assets are given by the equation:
di,t =
(1 + r∗)Et(st+1|i)− (1 + r)st)
µσ2i,t
(6)
where 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 is the coefficient of risk aversion and σ2i,t the risk variable associated
with this demand (more details on the calculation of the risk will follow). We also note
that the optimal holdings depend on the expected market demand for the foreign asset
Dt; that is the sum of the weighted demands of all agents:
Dt = ΣNi=1ni,tdi,t (7)
where ni,t is the number of agents employing the specific strategy i at time t. For
equilibrium the market demand is always met by the market supply Z (So Zt = Dt).
One of the cornerstones of the model is the behavior-specifying fitness criteria. The
rules used here are a straightforward adaptation of the work of Brock and Hommes [2, 14]
but a number of different criteria have been proposed [21, 22].
The current fitness criterion reflects the fraction of the agents in the population
utilizing a specific strategy. It is a function depending on the risk adjusted profits and falls
into the greater category of logit rules. One of the first to apply the logit rules in finance
was Theil [23] and has ever since served as a common ground for econometric research.
In the current case, the fraction of the population using chartist (wc) or fundamentalist
(wf ) forecasting rules are described as :
wi,t =
eγpi
′
i,t
eγpi
′
C,t + eγpi
′
F,t
, 0 ≤ γ,i = {F,C} (8)
where γ is the coefficient of update intensity and pi′i,t the risk adjusted profit for agents
using strategy i at time t. As γ increases agents choose the more profitable rule more
quickly. On the other hand, as γ decreases agents are more hesitant to change their
behavior preference based on the prior relative profitability of their strategy. While the
reader might believe that it is reasonable for traders to have a γ → ∞, as this would
mean that the agents instantly switch their behavior to the most profitable strategy,
empirical data show that traders do not behave according to this. Furthermore, and
quite counter-intuitive, from initial simulations and in line with the current literature
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[24], it is clear that the larger the γ, the higher the probability for the market clearing
exchange rate to be in a bubble-regime and away from the fundamental price; this results
in a more volatile and uncertain environment.
The risk-adjusted profit pi′i,t is formally given by the following formula:
pi′i,t = pii,t − µσ2i,t (9)
where pii,t is the profit prior to risk adjustment, µ as before is the risk aversion coefficient
and σ2i,t the variable representing the risk associated with each strategy. The profit
function is formally given as:
pii,t = [st−1(1 + r∗)− st−2(1 + r)]sgn[(1 + r∗)Et−1(st|i)− (1 + r)st−1], (10)
where:
sgn[x] =
 −1 if x < 00 if x = 01 if x > 0 (11)
Examining first the profit function itself it is made clear that profit opportunities arise
when the agents are able to exploit differences in the changes of the foreign exchange
rate s. Also, on a more technical note, under the current model, profits are given in a per
unit investment framework and not under total profit yield that can actually be based on
the initial wealth accumulated by an agent. Despite that, during the initialization of the
model we do assume all agents have an equal initial wealth. Another feature presented is
that this model penalizes wrong but seemingly not directly wealth-losing decisions. If the
market exchange rate rises, while the agent predicts that it would drop, then the agent
makes a per unit loss, because it appears as if he has sold foreign assets at a lower price
rather than actually holding (or buying), while the foreign assets have actually increased
their value.
Equally important is the term σ2i,t representing the risk values. Following the logic
of DeGrauwe and Grimaldi [24] it is assumed that agents represent risk through the last
period’s forecast error:
σ2i,t = (Et−1(st|i)− st)2 (12)
This is the most simplified risk assumed form in the literature but it is clearly one of the
most intuitive and less computationally demanding. It has to be mentioned here that
this procedure of fitness measurement serves ultimately as a form of learning through
social interaction. The agents employing a given strategy learn the merit/goodness of
the other strategy and based on this knowledge, revise their own strategy preference.
It is debatable whether or not such rules as the one presented here based on logit
principles or others, such as rules based on the Brown-von-Neumann-Nash principle [22]
can be applied as a real life approximation, because they rely on assumptions about
the agents having a full understanding about the other agents’ success (or failures).
Also, even if people shared all their information regarding their strategies’ outcome, the
fine time-scale of the model would raise certain issues about the efficiency of information
propagation. Possibly more accurate would be a regret rule [25, 26] ; where agents decide
their strategy based on whether or not certain criteria were met. This would though break
away from the existing norm in the literature and make the results incompatible with
the existing macrostructure literature.
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While the idea behind the technical means used by the chartists in order to make a
prediction is relatively obvious even in some of the most sophisticated cases (in the end,
it will be some ARIMA or GARCH variant), fundamentalists rely on some basic laws of
motion in order to model the future movement of the latent fundamental price. UIP, the
Uncovered Interest Parity, condition serves as such. The UIP is a basic algebraic identity
relating interest rates and exchange rates in form of expectations. The UIP, utilizing the
the current exchange rate and the fraction between the interest rates per unit of time of
the two currencies traded, allows the estimation of the exchange rate’s future movement.
In the current setting UIP is expressed as: s∗t =
1+r
1+r∗ s
∗
t−1. (where as before s
∗
t is the
latent fundamental exchange rate at time t and r and r∗ denote the domestic and foreign
currency interest rates respectively). Therefore, assuming a Gaussian expectation error
term N(0, Q) for the noise process t, the UIP can be re-written as:
s∗t =
1 + r
1 + r∗
s∗t−1 + t (13)
Through the UIP, and always assuming that the risk premium and the transactions costs
are negligible, the market moves to nullify the effect of carry trade. Clearly the difference
in interest rates is one of the fundamental profit generating phenomena in the foreign
exchange market that traders exploit. The model presented here provides an indirect
explanation as to how the carry traders actually act. More details about the exact
calculation of the fundamental exchange rate follow in the next section.
The final element of this model is clearly the Market Clearing rate determination. The
market mechanism employed, clears the market numerically assuming that the realized
change in the market equals the combined market forecast at time t by chartist and
fundamentalist traders with the addition of white noise errors N(0, R). Because of that
the market clearing exchange rate is given as:
st = wt,CEt(st+1|C) + wt,FEt(st+1|F ) +N(0, R) (14)
As LeBaron [10] suggests, this kind of price determination process overcomes issues
of rationing, or market-maker inventories that need to dealt with. Furthermore this
framework is rather easy to implement (a cumbersome issue in some settings) and it
is not numerically costly. The only main draw-back, as the same author notes, is that
it may impose too much market clearing, but this is an issue outside the scope of the
current work.
Summarizing the model, it is acceptable that a series of simplifications have been
made. Nevertheless the model is based on solid behavioral theoretical frameworks. It
overcomes the standard problem of the REEM (Rational Expectations - Efficient Mar-
ket) model that has dominated financial analysis since the 60’s and has caused it to fail
to provide predictive and explanatory power in recent years. The presented model is a
member of the greater family of models known as Adaptive Belief Systems in Finance
as they were presented by Rieck [27]. Making a final comment about the two differ-
ent strategies/behaviors it is important to mention that empirical evidence does imply
that in many cases, traders perceive chartist and fundamentalist analysis techniques as
complementary approaches.
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3. Kalman Filter
The Kalman filter plays a crucial role to the estimation of the latent fundamental
price; the price that is actually used by the fundamentalists in order to make their fore-
cast. The Kalman filter itself is a discrete, recursive linear filter proposed by Rudolf
Kalman in 1960 [28] and has played a crucial role in modern implementations of naviga-
tion systems and in Control Theory in general.
In the filter’s original application, the position/state of the system had to be es-
tablished using noisy measurements from sensors and basic estimates relying on the
knowledge of the processes describing the system itself (i.e. laws of motions). The origi-
nal implementation also assumed that the measurement and process error are Gaussian
distributed. The filter utilizes the last known measurement of the state of the system
and forecasts a prior estimate of the next period’s value of the system’s latent variable,
then it combines this estimate with the actual realization of the next period to calibrate
its forecast. It has to be noted that the Kalman filter itself is optimal in the sense that
it utilizes all available information in a mean square sense.
Cheung [29] used a Kalman filter algorithm in order to estimate exchange rate risk
premia. In a similar manner, Faust et al. [30] have recently used a Kalman filter ap-
proach to analyze the underlying fundamentals regarding the dollar risk premia also. To
draw an analogy with the previous example coming from navigation, here the system’s
noisy measurements are the market clearing exchange rate values. The UIP estimate has
the role of the system’s underlying process. Chartists methods are typically applied in
short horizon decision making, therefore using the Kalman filter to derive fundamental
exchange rate information is done because we are focusing on days where news announce-
ments are done. Because of that, the latent fundamental price has a significant variance
despite the short term horizon. Also traders that failed to make correct market predic-
tions about interest rates changes, are put into a price discovery process that further
amplifies the changes in the market exchange rate. Here it is worth mentioning the work
done be Stratanovich in the 60’s and by Julier and Uhlman [31] in recent years to account
for non-linear cases. Because of the analytically simple model, that we are using it is not
necessary to follow this route; however, any real time financial application of a Kalman
filter should definitely focus on the implementation of a Stratonovich-Kalman-Bucy or a
Unscented Kalman filter.
The implementation of a Kalman filter is relatively straightforward conceptually. The
main theoretical notions behind it are widely known: Bayes Rule, Gaussian distributions
and linear equations of motion (or in the present case the UIP). First we show the
prediction step of the Kalman filter, modified to our specific system2:
s∗−t =s
∗
t−1
1 + r
1 + r∗
(15)
P−t =P
−
t−1(
1 + r
1 + r∗
)2 +Q (16)
nt =st −A1s∗−t −A2st−1 −A3st−3 (17)
ft =(A1)2P−t +R, (18)
2The setting employed is the one based on the suggested setting by Kim and Nelson on the book on
State-Space Models [32]
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where s∗− is the expected (estimated) value of the latent fundamental exchange rate s∗
utilizing information up to time t-1, P− is the a priori estimated error variance, n is the
prediction error, f is the conditional variance of the prediction error and R and Q are
the measurement and process noise variances.
In this first step the filter estimates the latent variable’s value at time t utilizing all
available information up to time t− 1. The crucial update step is as follows:
Kt =
A1P
−
t
ft
(19)
s∗t = s
∗−
t +Ktnt (20)
Pt = (1−KtA1)P−t , (21)
where Kt is the Kalman gain, and Pt is the a posteriori estimation of the error variance.
The Kalman gain is therefore chosen in a way that minimizes the a posteriori error
variance. A high conditional error variance f will numb the effect that the measure st
has on the final estimate of the latent variable and the final estimation will rely mostly
on the initial prediction. Vice versa, if P−, the error estimate in the process is very high,
the final estimation will rely on the measurement (the market clearing exchange rate),
more heavily.
The simplicity of the model renders the incorporation of news effects quite easy.
Changes in r or r∗, the interest rates concerning the domestic and foreign currency re-
spectively, can be propagated instantly in the prediction stage of the algorithm, affecting
the derivation of s∗− and P−.
The Kalman filter itself is then optimized in order to reproduce results by stochastic
simulations that exhibit the features apparent in real data. This is done by trying to
minimize concurrently the difference between two indicators of the statistical properties
of the time-series examined. The Standard Deviation, and it’s Kurtosis, both of them
formally being calculated by the following formulas:
σ =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(xi − x)2, K =
1
NΣ
n
i=1(xi − x)4
( 1NΣ
n
i=1(xi − x)2)2
(22)
The exact dates used in the analysis are the following : 1. January 2, 2003 (no news
announcements present) 2. January 9, 2003 (news announcement for stable interest
rates) 3. February 6, 2003 (news announcement for decreased interest rates (-.25%))
and 4. November 6, 2003 (news announcement for increased interest rates (+.25%)) 3.
While the four different aggregation scales that were mentioned in the Introduction were
examined, the data and results shown in the current study were based on the 5-second
aggregated data.
The Kalman filter is therefore used to derive the fundamental rate of the examined
and the simulated exchange rates. Real data are used in order to provide a reference to
ensure that the simulated series are indeed in line with real data (Table 4).
3More information available at [3]
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4. Numerical Results
The complexity of the model implies it is impossible to approach analytically. There-
fore, we rely on numerical simulations to investigate the model’s behavior. In order to
achieve this, the model was implemented in C++. The questions formulated address
different subjects regarding the behavioral characteristics of the model. First we focus
on the differences between the known coefficients from cases where the model was used to
interpret data coming from daily averages, and the newly computed coefficients derived
during the fine-tuning of the model. Second, we focus on the effect that news arrivals
have in the market and how they affect agents’ choice of strategy. The third and final
question focuses on the per unit profitability of each agents’ strategy.
Addressing the first question, it has to be noted that the basic behavior of the model
is in line with DeGrauwe’s findings [11]. This is a standalone result on its own and is
quite interesting given the fact that the known behavior of the model regards cases of
macro-scale (daily scale) rather than micro-scale (second scale) data (Table 1).
The stylized facts about a Chartist-Fundamentalist market framework as the one
proposed here, are as follows:
Sensitivity to β. The lower β, the coefficient of chartists extrapolation, is known
to anchor the market clearing foreign exchange rate closer to the otherwise la-
tent fundamental rate and results in a less volatile market clearing rate. It also
suggests that the kurtosis of the distribution of st moves further away from the
expected gaussian kurtosis of Kurt=0, exhibiting a platykurtotic behavior. De-
spite the apparent deviation from the known literature, this is truly in line with
the experimental data that suggest kurtosis values between -1.19 and 0.36, showing
platykurtotic behavior also. (See Appendix A - Table 4)
Sensitivity to γ. The higher γ, the coefficient of choice update intensity, results in
higher volatility in the market clearing foreign exchange rate. It also causes the
market rate to have a greater disconnection from the fundamental rate.
Sensitivity to ψ. The higher ψ, the coefficient of fundamentalists belief’s intensity,
does lead to higher volatility in the market clearing rate s, but it forces it to move
closer to the fundamental rate s∗ also. The kurtosis of the sample is forced further
away from the norm of 0. It appears as if fundamentalists traders, force the latent
fundamental rate to behave accordingly to their beliefs, resulting a fundamental
rate that is itself more volatile.
Insensitivity to µ. In contrast with the above mentioned parameter, the risk aver-
sion coefficient µ, as also noted in the case of daily data, does not appear to have
a significant effect on the final market clearing rate. De Grauwe himself downplays
its importance in his model. Clearly if µc 6= µf then the model would have a whole
different dynamic behavior but this scenario is not investigated in the current study.
Sensitivity to Q. Clearly Q, the underlying process noise, has an important impact
on the whole behavior of the model. Lower values of Q, result in less volatile behav-
ior in the market price formation mechanism, more gaussian-like distribution, and
less disconnections between the market clearing rate and the latent fundamental
rate.
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Sensitivity to R. As in the case of Q, R also affects the market clearing rate in a
significant way. Less measurement noise, allows the agents to trust the realized rate
more. As a result the market clearing rate becomes less volatile but in addition it
exhibits larger deviations from the fundamental rate. The kurtosis of the realized
rate appears significantly changed pushing the (log) values of it to an even more
bernoulli -like distribution.
Table 1 shows our numerical findings 4. The reference values associated with the model
are as follows: 1. β = 0.94 , 2. γ = 500 , 3. µ = 0.915 , 4. ψ = 0.002, 5. Q = 3 ∗ 10−10
and 6. R = 1.5 ∗ 10−9. The values derived are based on the log of the actual values of
st. In each case all the variables of the model are set to be equal to the reference values
and only the one denoted for the specific column is changed.
Reference Setting β = 0.84 γ = 1000 µ = 0.715
Standard Dev. 0.001268 (.0004416) 0.001148 (.000394) 0.001275 (.0004445) 0.001268 (.0004416)
Kurtosis -0.670048 (.5235370) -0.671943 (.512261) -0.669449 (.523935) -0.670048 (.5235370)
Σ(s− s∗)2 0.002799 (.0032512) 0.002496 (.001650) 0.002828 (.00185347) 0.002799 (.0032512)
Reference Setting ψ = 0.02 Q = 9.01 ∗ 10−10 R = 8 ∗ 10−9
Standard Dev. 0.001268 (.0004416) 0.001502 (.0005728) 0.001493 (.00056307) 0.001754 (.0004401)
Kurtosis -0.670048 (.5235370) -0.666427 (.517974) -0.701636 (.528471) -0.494171 (.468305)
Σ(s− s∗)2 0.002799 (.0032512) 0.000253 (.000900) 0.001136 (.0009075) 0.017939 (.0105638)
Table 1: Basic numerical results displaying the different responses of the simulated exchange rate s, to
individual parameter changes
It is quite important to stress here the differences between the known coefficient for
daily and for intra-daily data; examining first the coefficient β and µ the proposed model
are in line with values proposed by De Grauwe [24] in his seminal work on exchange
rates.
On the contrary γ and ψ appear significantly different, differing by at least a scale of
magnitude from the values suggested by DeGrauwe’s models. The coefficient of update
intensity has to be raised by almost two scales of magnitude; from a value γ = 5 to
10 suggested in most models based on daily closing price, to the current model use of
γ ’s that moves up to 1000. Also the coefficient of fundamentalists belief intensity is
clearly decreased, from approximately 0.2 in De Grauwe’s models it is reduced to 0.002.
Both these facts are easily explained based on the idea that on the one hand larger γ ’s
are necessary for the model to actually cause the agents to move. Otherwise the model
remains firmly close to its steady stare of wc = wf = 12 . The intra-daily interest rate
(if assumed that there are indeed such rates) is so small that the agents do not have
an incentive to actually update their strategy. Also, ψ is definitely smaller. It will be
almost infeasible for a fundamentalist trader to believe that the market clearing rate
will indeed fluctuate so much in the course of one day, and that the market itself will
be able to regulate itself back to the fundamental in such a small time-scale. As shown
in the Figure 1, the market clearing price is not firmly attached on the fundamental
rate in the same way that it is in the case of daily exchange rates. Little to no new
fundamental information may be available during a small 8 hour interval, and therefore
according to standard economic theory, no significant changes should be apparent in the
fundamental price itself (except obviously by the drift imposed by the UIP conditions).
4As derived by the aggregation of 100 runs of each set-up
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Q and R finally are significantly smaller, than most models encountered in the literature
that deal with daily data [12, 17], this is obviously due to fact that much finer scale
data are examined. It should be stressed however that the fine tuning of the model relys
finally on the correct choice of Q and R. The noise in this kind of model is the key factor
changing the whole behavior of the model itself.
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Figure 1: Calculating fundamental exchange rate s∗ in real and simulated s
The next question focuses on the effect of news. News are phenomena that substan-
tially change the financial environment in which agents act. In this case news are defined
as the news announcements regarding the changes in sterling’s interest rate by the Bank
of England. This type of news provide the luxury of knowing the exact timing when they
are released in the public (midday) and are well documented and easy to quantify. They
contain a problem though; traders do have the ability to anticipate them. Agents are
able to make prior predictions about the magnitude of the change in the interest rate.
That way, based on their predictions they are able to plan ahead and subsequently not
lose their connection to the fundamental rate. In essence, the volatility of the market
clearing price in most real cases is a product of the agents that wrongly predicted the
subsequent changes in s∗ and their consequences on s and therefore enter a price discov-
ery procedure. Simulating this situation we focus on two different scenarios: One where
there is a drop in the interest rate and another where there is a rise. We also focus on
a smaller time interval. Clearly the market agents have the ability to calibrate their
future strategies quite efficiently and adjust quickly to the new fundamentals; therefore
an arbitrary 1 hour interval before and after the news announcement is examined.
Figure 2 exhibits market conditions after a drop (-0.25%) and after a rise (+0.25%).
These changes are coherent with the actual changes that are announced by the Bank of
England. It is quite clear that we fail to observe news arrival effects. This is further em-
phasized by the almost identical basic statistical measurements used for characterization
of the systems5. In Figure 2 the top diagram shows the absolute difference between mar-
ket exchange rate s and latent fundamental value s∗. In addition, the lower half shows
the proportion of agents using chartists behavior. It is easily seen that the proportion
of chartists increase during times when there are significant drops or jumps between s
and s∗. It also suggests that fundamentalist traders are able to remain in an otherwise
5For these cases and the following, the simulation depth was increased 20-fold, reaching now 2000
runs
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overpriced market by exploiting small fluctuations due to random noise. Nevertheless, in
the case of large jumps between s and s∗, only the chartists apparently have the ability
to exploit them.
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(b) Raise in GBP interest rates
Figure 2: Top diagram : Absolute difference between st and s∗t - Bottom diagram : Chartist market
proportion (wc) (using simulated series)
Simulated Data No Changes Raise Drop
Standard Dev. 0.0007012 (.00021688) 0.0006976 (.00021553) 0.0007021 (.0002159)
Kurtosis -0.546445 (.6021) -0.537724 (.602013) -0.540222 (.606914)
Σ(s− s∗)2 0.0008851 (.00082631) 0.0008754 (.00082766) 0.0008842 (.000833181)
wC 0.54339 ( 0.0923494) 0.54651 ( 0.0923494) 0.54028 ( 0.0913788)
Table 2: Numerical results of news effects on s
The final question is to consider the profitability which each behavior enjoys. The
same three scenarios as before are used. In all three cases both the chartists and the
fundamentalists appear to be losing money (Table 3). In the cases examined, the average
of the sum of the total risk adjust profits per unit invested under both chartist and
fundamentalist approaches, suggest negative values. While this is clearly disturbing for
the validity of the model in real application, it is important to stress the fact that the
fundamentalists always appear to lose more.
Simulated Data (2000x) No Changes Raise Drop
Chartists Risk Adjust Profits -0.158067 (.00233209) -0.158066 (.0023297) -0.158068 (.00233171)
Fundamentalists Risk Adjust Profits -0.222021 (.00259213) -0.222021 (.00259183) -0.222021 (.00259218)
Table 3: Average of total risk-adjusted profitability per unit
5. Discussion
The most solid results of this model were the apparent importance of the successful
estimation of the process (Q) and of the measurement noise (R) in order to get meaningful
results that correspond to empirical data. Noise (and thus the risk) in the system is by
far the most prevalent factor of any decision making procedure. It is clear that there
are no well documented techniques in order to fine tune it. All techniques proposed,
ultimately rely on heuristics rather than a solid analytical framework. This raises the
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argument about the usage of Uncertainty principles, as proposed by Knight [33, 34] and
has been the focus of the paper by Kozhan and Salmon [12]. The noise in the process
itself changes the whole model’s behavior because it dictates the drift of the otherwise
random walk that the fundamental values follow within the course of a day. Surprisingly,
this feature has been downplayed in the literature. Furthermore the measurement error,
is equally important. While is widely accepted that the market players do not know the
full mechanics of the market formation mechanism and thus act under uncertainty rather
than risk, only a few research papers deal with Knightian uncertainty.
One rather welcome byproduct of the model is that as in the case of daily data, it suc-
ceeds in reproducing bubble-crash asymmetries. What the model suggests takes place,
is that in a bubble-run the chartists exploit the trend moving away from the fundamen-
tal rate amplifying its movement, while the fundamentalists push the rate back to the
fundamental value. In that way the exchange rate s is standing between two different
opposing trends. On the contrary, when in a crash, both fundamentalists and chartists,
push the market exchange rate back to its fundamental rate. Under this scenario, the
exchange rate s is under two co-directional trends and therefore the movement back to
the fundamental rate is more steep and violent.
The main inability of the model came when trying to effectively model what occurs
in the case of news arrivals in real life markets. The model, in its proposed format, failed
to reproduce news arrivals effects. While it is clear that news arrivals do influence the
market, the current model does not exhibit such behavior. This is quite possibly because
the model does not contain order flow parameters and also because the chartist rule used,
is too simplistic.
An interesting finding under the examination of news arrivals effects was the volatile
4th moment behavior of the exchange rate. This further signifies the truly chaotic be-
havior of the price formation mechanism. It further provides evidence for the apparent
inability of standard statistical measurements to explain the market mechanism fully.
An important finding though was the actual prevalence of chartists traders during
times of turmoil. As the market fluctuates, fundamentalists cannot rationalize it and
therefore the only group exploiting this trend is the chartist one. This is further enforced
by the fact that it appears that the market clearing rate and the fundamental rate are
not tightly bound with each other. Fluctuations in the market clearing rate, can be
introduced due to noise effects that are subsequently amplified and are incomprehensible
to fundamentalist traders.
As mentioned above, possibly the chartist rule is too simplistic; nevertheless the
chartist group exhibit lower losses than the fundamentalists. Their irrational behavior,
contrary to the prediction of the REEM6 framework, allows them to survive in such
markets (if not prevail in times of big fluctuations). Chartists are therefore evolutionary
stable. Even in the cases that the market clearing price is not completely disconnected by
the fundamental rate, a chartist trader, still exploits the stable trend and thus remains in
the market. The bounded rational fundamentalists agents, on the other hand appear to
be almost unrealistic at times. It has to be noted at this point that these measurements
are measures of the risk adjusted profitability and not of the actual profits or losses
sustained by the agents. In addition, the chartists’ forecast does incorporate less risk
6Rational Expectations Efficient Market
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on average in comparison with that of the fundamentalists’ and therefore the chartist
behavior remains favorable in cases where a chartist strategy would not substantially
favor an agent.
As a concluding remark it has to be reported that the proportion of chartists is
increased by noise in the market. Interestingly, this remark is also reversible. The noise
in the market is itself amplified by the chartists.
6. Conclusions and further remarks
In this report we have estimated a model for the US dollar British pound exchange
rate, and examined the dynamics of the exchange rate. Using the well-established model
of Brock and Hommes as a basis, we present a simplified version in order to apply it to
intra-daily exchange rate movements.
Our main finding is that chartist and fundamentalist strategies ultimately coexist in
the market despite the markets’ chaotic nature. In addition, the fundamental price does
not appears to be the sole source of volatility in the market, emphasizing the importance
of empirical finance in understanding the underlying mechanism of the exchange rates
determination.
There are a number of fruitful routes for future research. Introducing co-integration
between the market clearing rate and the fundamental rate and employing a more ad-
vanced agent behavior framework are the most obvious. Furthermore, the integration
of uncertainty and the incorporation of real unevenly spaced tick-by-tick data, will also
allow us to determine the role of uncertainty and order flows in explaining real intra-daily
exchange rate fluctuations as occur in reality.
Appendix A.
Real Data 2 Jan 03 7 Jan 03 6 Feb 03 6 Nov 03
Standard Dev. 0.001678 0.001249 0.001887 0.001180
Kurtosis 0.368105 -0.431407 -1.191557 -0.615029
Σ(s− s∗)2 0.01610 0.011683 0.013422 0.010590
Table 4: Basic measurements of actual intra daily data
References
[1] Monetary, E. Department, Triennial central bank survey of foreign exchange and derivatives market
activity in april 2007, Tech. rep., Bank for International Settlements (2007).
[2] W. Brock, C. Hommes, Heterogeneous beliefs and routes to chaos in a simple asset pricing model,
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 22 (1998) 1235–1274.
[3] B. of England, Monetary policy committee decisions 2003 (2010).
URL http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/decisions/decisions03.htm
[4] A.-H. Sato, Frequency analysis of tick quotes on foreign currency markets and the double-threshold
agent model, Physica A 369 (2006) 753 – 764.
[5] A.-H. Sato, Frequency analysis of tick quotes on the foreign exchange market and agent-based
modeling: A spectral distance approach, Physica A 382 (2007) 258 – 270.
14
[6] K. S. T. M. T. H. Mizuno, Takayuki, Analysis of high-resolution foreign exchange data of usd-jpy
for 13 years, Physica A 324 (2003) 296 – 302.
[7] J. J. Frankel, A. F. Kenneth, Understanding the u.s. dollar in the eighties : The expectations of
chartists and fundamentalists, Economic record 0 (1986) 24–38.
[8] J. J. Frankel, A. F. Kenneth, Chartists, fundamentalists, and the trading in the foreign exchange
market, American Economic Review 11 (1990) 181–185.
[9] P. De Grauwe, H. Dewatcher, A chaotic model of the exchange rate: The role of fundamentalists
and chartists, Open Economies Review 4 (1993) 351–379.
[10] B. LeBaron, The Handbook of Computational Economics, North-Holland, 2006, Ch. Agent-Based
Computational Finance.
[11] P. D. Grauwe, M. Grimaldi, Exchange rate puzzles a tale of switching attractors, European
Economic Review 50 (2006) 1–33.
[12] R. Kozhan, M. Salmon, Uncertainty aversion in a heterogeneous agent model of foreign exchange
rate formation, Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control (33) (2009) 1106–1122.
[13] L. Sarno, M. P. Taylor, The microstructure of the foreign exchange market: A selective survey of
the literature, Princeton Studies in International Economics.
[14] W. Brock, C. Hommes, A rational route to randomness, Econometrica 65 (1997) 1059–1095.
[15] M. Hellwig, Rational excpectations equilibrium with conditioning on past prices: A mean-variance
example, Journal of Economic Theory 26 (1982) 279–312.
[16] H. C. M. S. Boswijk, H.P., Behavioral heterogeneity in stock prices, Journal Of Economic Dynamics
& Control 31 (2007) 1938–1970.
[17] R. R. S. M. Menkhoff, L., Heterogeneity in exchange rate expectations: Evidence on the chartist-
fundamentalist approach, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 70 (2009) 241–252.
[18] W. F. Hommes, C.H., Complex evolutionary systems in behavioral finance, Tinbergen Institute
Discussion Paper.
[19] R. Dieci, F. Westerhoff, Heterogeneous speculators, endogenous fluctuations and interacting mar-
kets: A model of stock prices and exchange rates, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 34
(2010) 743–764.
[20] M. Taylor, H. Allen, The use of technical analysis in the foreign exchange market, Journal of
International Money and Finance 11 (1992) 304–314.
[21] A. P. Kirman, Money and Financial Markets, Macmillan, London, 1991, Ch. Epidemics of opinion
and speculative bubbles in financial markets.
[22] J. Hofbauer, J. Oechssler, F. Riedel, Brown-von neumann-nash dynamics: The continuous strategy
case, Tech. rep., EconWPA (2005).
[23] H. Theil, A multinomial extension of the linear logit model, International Economic Review 10
(1969) 251–259.
[24] P. De Grauwe, M. Grimaldi, The Exchange Rate in a Behavioral Finance Framework, Princeton
University Press, 2006, Ch. A slightly more complex behavioral finance model.
[25] C. F. Manski, Minimax-regret treatment choice with missing outcome data, Journal of Econometrics
139 (2007) 105–115.
[26] A. Wald, Statistical decision functions which minimize the maximum risk, Annals of Mathematics
46 (1945) 265–280.
[27] C. Rieck, Many-Agent Simulation and Artificial Life, IOS Press, 1994, Ch. Evolutionary simulation
of asset trading strategies.
[28] R. Kalman, A new approach to linear filtering and prediction problems, Journal of Basic Engineer-
ing.
[29] Y.-W. Cheung, Exchange rate risk premium, Journal of International Money and Finance 12 (1993)
182–194.
[30] R. J. H. W. S. W. J. Faust, J., The high-frequency response of exchange rates and interest rates to
macroeconomic announcements, Journal of Monetary Economics 54 (2007) 10511068.
[31] U. J. Julier, S.J., H. Durrant-White, A new approach for filtering nonlinear systems, Proceedings
of the 1995 American Control Conference.
[32] C. Kim, C. R. Nelson, State-Space Models with Regime Switching - Classical and Gibbs-Sampling
Approaches with Applications, MIT Press, 1999, Ch. State-Space Models and the Kalman Filter.
[33] F. Knight, Risk Uncertainty and Profit, Boston: Houghton Miﬄin, 1921.
[34] J. Dow, S. Werlang, Uncertainty aversion, risk aversion, and the optimal choice of portfolio, Econo-
metrica 60 (1) (1992) 197–204.
15
